Language

All About Face: Use of Facial Recognition and Legal Restrictions

All About Face: Use of Facial Recognition and Legal Restrictions

 

Author: Yingying Zhu, Partner of Beijing MingDun Law Firm

Email: zhu.yingying@mdlaw.cn

Date: November 10, 2021

 

Introduction

From public places laden with facial verification cameras to residential buildings that shut strangers out with facial identification requirements, facial recognition technology is being used almost everywhere in China which has contributed to the low criminal rates and high level of public security, earning China the reputation as one of the safest places in the world to travel around.[1] Beyond the bright side, there has been at least one dark side to the overwhelming use of cameras-the possible leaks of people’s biometric identification information to outlaws and hackers. Nowadays, the public becomes increasingly concerned about providing their facial data to various service providers. The calls for safeguarding and curbing excessive uses of people’s facial data are on the rise.

 

Background

On November 1st, 2021, China’s first comprehensive data privacy law, the Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “PIPL”), has become effective. The PIPL basically requires that the operators of websites, mobile phone applications or any other technologies doing data collection and processing should obtain consent from users in order to collect/process the users’ data.

To address the increasing public concerns of the necessity to curb the abuses of people’s biometric data, the PIPL specifically regulates the collection of biometric data and the use of facial recognition technology in public areas.

Apart from the enactment of the PIPL, there was a lawsuit in Hangzhou stemming from dispute over the use of facial recognition equipment and a judicial interpretation on the same subject promulgated by the China Supreme People’s Court.

 

What is facial recognition?

No definition is provided under the PIPL or the judicial interpretation. According to The Future of Privacy Forum, the Facial recognition (currently defined to include facial verification and facial identification) means the technology that creates, collects, compares and retains facial templates that are identified or identifiable to particular individuals.[2]

Facial verification means a task where the facial recognition system confirms an individual’s claimed identity by comparing the template generated from a submitted facial image with a specific known template generated from a previously enrolled facial image. This process is also called one-to-one verification, or authentication.[3] 

Facial Identification means searching a database for a reference matching a submitted facial template and returning a corresponding identity, also known as “one-to-many” matching.[4]

From the above definitions, it can be deduced that facial recognition technology is not an equivalent of the conventional public camera surveillance[5] because it involves more than passive facial scanning and recording. If the usage of public surveillance camera involves no creation of personably identifiable facial templates which are identified or linked, or identifiable or linkable to individuals, it would neither constitute “facial recognition” nor arouse the same type of privacy concerns discussed under this article.

 

PIPL on facial recognition

 

1) processing of facial recognition data

Under the PIPL, facial recognition data, being a type of the biometric identification information, are classified under a specific category of information, sensitive personal information,[6] that must be treated with the following extra safeguarding:

1)   Personal information processors may not process sensitive personal information unless there are specific purposes and sufficient necessity, and strict protection measures are taken (Art. 28);

2)   An individual's separate consent shall be obtained for processing his or her sensitive personal information. Where any law or administrative regulation provides that written consent shall be obtained for processing sensitive personal information, such provision shall prevail (Art. 29); and

3)   To process sensitive personal information, personal information processors shall, notify individuals of the following:

    (a) identity of the processor (Art. 17);

    (b) purposes and methods of processing of personal information, categories of personal information to be processed, and the retention periods (Art. 17);

    (c) methods and procedures for individuals to exercise their rights (Art. 17);

    (d) necessity of the processing of sensitive personal information (Art. 30); and

    (e) the impacts on individuals’ rights and interests, except that it is not required by this Law to so notify (Art. 30).

 

2) use of facial recognition technology in public areas

Regarding the use of facial recognition technology in public areas, the PIPL provides as follows:

1)   The installation of image collection or personal identification equipment in public areas shall be necessary for maintaining public security and comply with relevant regulations issued by the state (Art. 26);

2)   Conspicuous signs shall be erected (Art. 26); and

3)   The collected personal images and identification information can only be used for the purpose of maintaining public security, and shall not be used for other purposes, except with the separate consent of individuals (Art. 26).

The above provisions basically provide that the use of facial recognition technology in public areas is only allowed for the purpose of maintaining public security where conspicuous signs shall be erected. It cannot be used for marketing, targeted advertising or any other commercial purposes, unless separate consent of individuals has been obtained.

One has but one face. Facial information is of a unique and unchangeable character for the individuals. As improper disclosures of facial data can cause greater harm and damage to the image, reputation or security of an individual, it is of significant importance to ensure that facial data be specifically categorized and appropriately protected. The PIPL’s position in regulating the use of facial recognition data echoes with that of the GDPR. [7]

 

A GDPR decision on the use of facial recognition

A decision handed down in August 2019 under the GDPR could shed some light on the position taken by the GDPR towards the use of facial recognition data. The Swedish Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) has imposed a fine of approximately 20,000 euros upon a municipality for using facial recognition technology to monitor the attendance of students in school. The school in northern Sweden has conducted a trial program using facial recognition to keep track of students’ attendance in school. The students’ guardians were asked to give and gave explicit consent and they also had the option of excluding their child from the program. The school has based the processing on consent but the Swedish DPA considers that consent was not a valid legal basis given the clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller. The Swedish DPA concluded the school has processed sensitive biometric data unlawfully and failed to do an adequate impact assessment including seeking prior consultation with the Swedish DPA. [8]

Under the GDPR, biometric data, [9] including that generated through facial recognition technology, is protected as a special category of personal data since it is uniquely and strongly identifying to a person. The GDPR prohibits the processing of such data unless there is explicit consent, a legal obligation or public interest. In order to ensure that consent is freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation.[10] Judging from the clear imbalance between the students/their guardians and the school in the above case, the Swedish Data Protection Authority held the school liable under the GDPR for unlawfully processing the students’ facial data.

 

First lawsuit over facial recognition in China

Interestingly in contrast with the Swedish school case, also happened in 2019 and before the enactment of the PIPL, a court in Hangzhou ruled in the country’s first facial recognition lawsuit that the use of facial recognition technology for admission to a local safari park constituted a breach of the contract between the plaintiff and the Park.

Guo Bing, an associate law professor in Hangzhou city, filed a civil lawsuit against Hangzhou Safari Park in late 2019 after the Park required a facial identification process for his annual membership pass. He argued the Hangzhou Safari Park has no legal basis to collect visitors’ biometric data. Both courts in the first instance and second instance ruled in favor of Guo Bing, ordering the Park to refund him and delete his facial data and fingerprints.[11]

However, the courts’ judgements are criticized for being too narrow and also for the failure to touch on the legitimacy of the Park’s overbearing policy which mandated facial identification for entry. From the perspective of contract law, the courts of first and second instance ruled that the Park’s requirement of facial recognition to enter the park does not have legal effect on Guo contractually, but the courts avoided the review of the arbitrary clause that 'users who have not registered their face for facial recognition will not be able to enter the park ever'. That is however the key claim in Guo’s lawsuit against the Park.

 The above being said, Guo’s case is still significant as the first lawsuit to challenge the commercial use of facial recognition technology. Citing Guo’s case, China’s Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) announced that consumers’ privacy must be protected from unwarranted face tracking,[12] a signal that China is tightening the leash on the facial recognition industry.

 

Judicial interpretation on use of facial recognition

On July 28, 2021 the SPC promulgated the Provisions (the “Provisions”) on several issues concerning the application of law in the trial of civil cases relating to processing of personal information by using the facial recognition technology.[13] The Provisions came into force on August 1, 2021.

The Provisions apply to civil cases that involve facial recognition technology. The Provisions set forth that hotels, shopping malls, airports and other commercial venues should not use facial recognition in violation of the laws and administrative regulations. The use of the technology is only allowed when there is clear legal basis and cannot exceed what is necessary, and companies must take measures to protect the facial data. The Provisions also provide that consent is not a valid legal basis if companies denied providing products or services on the condition that a consent is given, unless the processing of facial information is necessary for the provision of such products or services. Property management companies must obtain the consent of the residents before using facial recognition. In case of refusal of consent, alternative verification methods must be offered.

While the Provisions are not clear on what counts as necessary use, the possibility of penalties from lawsuits is likely to curb some excessive uses of people’s facial data. The Provisions also specifies a mechanism for the public to sue if their privacy has been violated and option for injunction is also available in cases where irreparable harm would be caused without an injunctive relief.

 

Key Takeaways

·   Thorough impact assessment should be conducted prior to the launching of any facial recognition implementation.

·   For businesses to stay compliant with the PIPL, despite the scale and the intent of the use of facial recognition technology, regulatory and professional opinions have to be consulted.

·   Consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in cases where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller.

·   Consent should be invalid if there is an “opt-in-or-leave” situation, unless the processing of facial data is absolutely necessary for the products or services offered.

 

Conclusion

After the enactment of the PIPL and the China Supreme People’s Court’s promulgation of the Provisions, it remains to be seen how the administration will enforce these rules, how the courts will adjudicate in lawsuits involving facial recognition and whether such enforcement/adjudication will actually curb the abuses of facial recognition technology. For whatever the future holds, one thing is certain: businesses must realize that to advance any frontier technology, building public trust is essential to the effectuation that the public can enjoy the benefits offered by the technology. Before the public can entrust their sensitive personal data to the facial recognition businesses, they must have confidence that the use is with necessity, and that the use is lawful, fair, transparent and also safely guarded.



 



[1] See https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1067645.shtml.

[2] See The Future of Privacy Forum, Privacy Principles for Facial-Recognition Technology in Commercial Applications (September 2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Final-Privacy-Principles-Edits-1.pdf.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Closed-circuit television (CCTV) or video surveillance is camera systems used to transmit signals to a specific location often with visualization on a limited number of televisions or computer monitors. See Hong Kong Lawyer, CCTV and Privacy Rights (December 2019).

[6]  Under the PIPL, sensitive personal information is defined as “the personal information of which the leakage or illegal use   could easily lead to the violation of the personal dignity of a natural person or harm to personal or property safety, including    information on biometric identification, religious beliefs, specific identity, health care, financial accounts, and personal whereabouts, and personal information of minors under the age of fourteen.” (Art. 28).

[7] The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

[8] See https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2019/facial-recognition-school-renders-swedens-first-gdpr-fine_sv.

[9] GDPR defines “biometric data” as personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data. See https://gdpr-info.eu/art-4-gdpr/.

[10] See https://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/recital-43-GDPR.htm.

[11] See https://xw.qq.com/cmsid/20201120A0EPDD00.

[12] See https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_13819929.

[13] See http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?Lib=law&Id=36687&keyword.


  • 相关资讯 More
  • 点击次数: 3
    2026 - 07 - 17
    导语股权收购、资产并购、业务分拆整合、新设合营企业,是企业扩大市场份额、完善产业链布局的主流商业手段。经营者集中事前申报,是《中华人民共和国反垄断法》设定的强制性前置合规程序,也是投融资交易中法务、合规团队首要核查的法律节点。  实务中,不同赛道的并购交易,监管审查范围、配套申报义务、材料披露尺度存在明显区分。本文结合现行有效法律法规、国家市场监督管理总局、国家发改委发布的官方实操文件,分别梳理大众快消行业并购、外资收购高科技企业两类高频交易场景下经营者集中申报实操要点。    一、快消品类经营者集中 日化、生活用纸、非处方健康消费品、包装食品等民生快消行业的境内、跨境并购,仅需完成经营者集中单一申报流程,不存在外商投资安全审查叠加义务,全部合规工作围绕市场公平竞争维度开展。  1. 申报触发判定标准依据《中华人民共和国反垄断法》(2022 修正)第二十六条、《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》(2024 修订)第三条,交易参与方上一会计年度的合并营业额达到下述任一标准,必须在股权交割、业务整合前向国家市场监督管理总局提交申报,未取得审查决定不得实施集中:一是参与集中的所有经营者全球合计年营业额超过 120 亿元,且至少两家经营者在中国境内年营业额均超过8 亿元以上;二是全部经营者境内合计年营业额超 40 亿元,且至少两家境内营业额均超过 8 亿元。金佰利公司拟收购科赴(Kenvue)公司股权是当前快消领域典型横向收购案例,交易覆盖纸巾、个人护理、家用护理等重合赛道,交易双方全球及中国区域营收规模均足额触发申报门槛。金佰利提交申报材料后,市场监管总局已要求金佰利就其计划以490亿美元收购Kenvue的交易提供补充信息,是快消行业经营者集中申报的典型参考实例。   ...
  • 点击次数: 6
    2026 - 07 - 10
    在民商事活动中经常会出现倒签合同的现象。倒签合同是指合作双方在合同签订生效之前已经开始实际履行合同,而在合同履行过程中或在合同履行完毕后补签合同的现象。倒签合同产生的原因有很多,主要包括:(1)合同双方当事人就合同条款谈判时间过长,而相关商品或服务又需要马上提供,所以基于双方良好合作关系,边提供商品或服务边就合同条款进行谈判;(2)合同条款已经定稿,合同当事人任何一方或双方内部审批流程拖延,而相关商品或服务又需要马上提供,所以基于双方良好合作关系,边提供商品或服务边办理内部审批流程;(3)合同当事人任何一方要求在付款方资金预算审批下来时再补签书面合同;(4)合同双方当事人在合同到期前未及时续签合同,导致合同到期后边提供商品或服务边办理续签手续;(5)合同当事人任何一方或双方对合同的含义、作用、风险认识不足。虽然合同当事人倒签合同有时也是迫不得已,但对倒签合同的风险认识不足也是一个重要原因。本文将结合一个案例分析倒签合同存在的法律风险,并进一步探讨应对策略。 一、案情简介X公司与Y公司装饰装修合同纠纷一案(参见北京市朝阳区人民法院(2023)京0105民初14693号民事判决书,北京市第三中级人民法院(2024)京03民终7139号民事判决书)2022年1月27日,X公司(承包人)与Y公司(发包人)签订涉案合同,X公司承接了Y公司发包的地下二层车库精装修工程,合同载明:计划开工日期为2021年8月1日,竣工日期为2021年10月30日,合同总价3067193.99元,为固定总价合同,按月完成工程量的80%支付进度款,工程完工验收合格并结算完成后,X公司申请工程款的支付,Y公司按合同付款日程支付至工程结算款的97%,结算款的3%作为质量保修金,一年保修期满经Y公司确认质量及维修全部合格后按合同付款日程无息退还。合同签订时X公司已经完成了装修工程,合同外无增减项,202...
  • 点击次数: 9
    2026 - 07 - 03
    从“遇见小面”诉“渝见小面”案看商标权的边界——四个字的招牌,三个字一样,就一定构成侵权吗?        2026年6月,一家连锁品牌告了一家夫妻小店,理由是商标侵权。连锁这边是“遇见小面”,夫妻店叫“渝见小面”。老板娘对着镜头哭诉说“我八块钱一碗的面,至少得卖一千碗才够赔”——画面一出来,舆情瞬间炸了。没几天,遇见小面创始人公开道歉、撤诉,还说要无偿把第35类“渝见小面”商标“送”给店主。                    (图源“遇见小面”抖音号)        一场诉讼,从起诉到道歉,翻车翻得干净利落。但热闹完了,正经问题还在:这场官司,从一开始就没有法律基础。 一、商标近似,不等于必然混淆          (图片来源于“央视频”抖音号)        遇见小面诉讼的核心主张之一是“四个字有三个字一样”,所以构成近似。        这个说法在法律上站不住。        根据国家知识产权局《商标侵权判断标准》第十九条,在同一种或类似商品/服务上使用近似商标的,还必须对“是否容易导致混淆”进行判断。混淆...
  • 点击次数: 16
    2026 - 06 - 12
    微结构能否申请实用新型专利?——从《专利法》规定、《客体指引》到司法实践的全面解析实用新型专利因审查周期短、费用较低、授权相对容易,成为许多中小企业和个人保护结构类创新的常用选择。然而,随着微纳制造、材料表面工程、微流控器件、电池电极等领域的快速发展,“微结构”相关技术日益增多,申请人常常面临一个核心问题:这类微尺度特征能否通过实用新型专利获得保护?本文结合《中华人民共和国专利法》(2020年修正)、国家知识产权局2023年发布的《关于实用新型专利保护客体判断的指引》(以下简称《客体指引》)、专利审查指南以及最高人民法院相关判例,系统分析微结构实用新型的保护边界,并提出实务撰写建议。一、实用新型专利的法律定义与保护客体《专利法》第二条第三款规定:“实用新型,是指对产品的形状、构造或者其结合所提出的适于实用的新的技术方案。”据此,实用新型保护客体需同时满足三个要件:产品、形状和/或构造,以及技术方案。《客体指引》进一步明确,实用新型仅保护经过产业方法制造的、有确定形状和构造且占据一定空间的实体。一切方法以及自然存在的物品,均不在保护范围之内。二、《客体指引》对形状、构造及微结构的明确界定《客体指引》对实用新型保护客体作出了较为细致的解释。其中,产品的形状是指可以从外部观察到的确定空间形态,不能以自然形成或随意堆放的形态作为特征。而产品的构造则是指各组成部分的安排、组织与相互关系,包括机械构造、线路构造以及复合层结构等。值得注意的是,《客体指引》明确将“物质的分子结构、组分、金相结构等”排除在构造之外。这意味着,如果微结构本质上是材料内部的分子或微观组织变化,即使能够产生积极技术效果,也难以被认定为受实用新型保护的构造。相比之下,复合层结构(如渗碳层、氧化层)因在宏观层面形成明确的分层与物理差异,通常可以作为构造特征获得保护。在材料特征的处理上,《客体指引》指出:仅使用已知材料...
× 扫一扫,关注微信公众号
铭盾MiNGDUN   www.mdlaw.cn                                               犀牛云提供企业云服务 
Copyright© 2008 - 2026 铭盾京ICP备14029762号-1                                                                                                                                隐私政策   免责声明       
X
1

QQ设置

3

SKYPE 设置

4

阿里旺旺设置

5

电话号码管理

6

二维码管理

展开